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GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION: TRADEOFFS OR COMPLEMENTS?* 
I. Introduction 
If we can count on any underlying certainty with respect to the 
international economic scene, it is that it is subject to severe shocks-­
and likely to remain so. It is, nevertheless, possible to recognize that 
the events of the last few years have been particularly cataclysmic in 
their impact, especially as far as the LDCs are concerned. These events, 
including oil, food and DC stagflation crises, have, among many other 
consequences not relevant to this paper, increased the disparity among 
the LDCs and helped bring into fuller focus the existence of large and 
growing gaps within and between individual countries of the developing 
and developed worlds. With respect to the growing gaps between 
the so-called Third and Fourth worlds, the political will among both old 
and nouveau riche to do something mean~ngful about it still seems to·be 
lacking; perhaps efforts under the still somewhat leaky umbrella of the 
"new international economic order~ currently under discussion in many 
quarters around the globe,will eventually begin to bear fruit. It is an 
important subject but one we do not intend to deal with here. With respect 
to the second and not wholly unrelated issue, which is the subject of this 
paper, the answer lies less in the international setting and more in the 
needs of a'new national economic order!' Here, growing awareness of the 
problem has, moreover, not as yet been accompanied by either a commensurate 
increase in unde~standing or a will to action. As long as this understanding 
remains incomplete, it is, of course, that much easier for the elites of the 
*Paper presented to the Conference on Economic Development and Income 
Distribution, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 
April, 1976. 
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developing countries--and others--to leave the matter at the rhetorical 
level. It will indeed be difficult for those inside the LDCs who would 
like to change the current state of inequity--or those outside who would 
like to help through advice and/or assistance--to be really effective in 
the absence of further progress on this front. 
We could of course argue a long while--but won't--on whether it is the 
absolute poverty or the relative within-country distribution of income which 
really represents the main problem. Certainly, for populations living 
near their caloric minima whose essential basic needs for food, clothing, 
and shelter have not yet been satisfied, it is the condition of "low-end 
poverty" that matters most. But I think it is reasonable to assert that 
for the vast majority of the populations of the developing world, certainly 
once they've started in motion, it is not some Rawlsian lexicographic 
ordering which affects their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, 
but their own (changing) standard of life relative to that of their country­
men which is now increasingly visible and yet apparently increasinglv 
unattainable. 1 The setting of "poverty lines" at $50 or $75 per capita, 
or the racking up of "basic needs" with dollar or caloric equivalents, is 
likely to reflect policy makers' aspirations rather than people's own 
priorities and perceptions. 
1when we assign different weights to the achievement of GNP gains by 
different groups (as proposed by Ahluwalia and Chenery--in Chapter XI of 
Redistribution with Growth, Chenery et al., Oxford University Press, 1974), 
we are acknowledging just that. - -
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Another, and possibly more pragmatic, reason for preferring to con­
centrate analysis on the relative rather than the absolute poverty issue 
is that the relative position of families and/or regions can be more 
easily integrated within the traditional general equilibrium analysis of 
the economic system, whether focussed on growth, technology or employment. 
Poverty at the low end of the income scale, whether in rich or poor coun­
tries, is, after all, an arbitrary concept usually tackled by "after the 
fact" measures, e.g., public employment, fiscal redistribution, food stamp 
programs and other transfers--all"secondary'strategies, if by''primary" 
strategy we mean the nature of the production process itself. Once we 
address the question of what happens to the poor, as tied to growth, 
employment and other aspects of the development pattern itself, it becomes 
analytically much easier to deal with relative rather than absolute poverty 
issues. This is because relationships between growth, employment and the 
size distribution of income constitute a nexus which is in large part 
linked up with technology choice and the functional distribution of income, 
both of which are relative concepts. 
With very few exceptions,2 the LDC development plans of the '50s and 
'60s dealt with employment and regional distribution objectives as part of 
a secondary strategy which would have to be deployed, if somewhat half­
heartedly, after the dust had settled on the primary, output-oriented 
2 one such was Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). 
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development program. More recently, public works as well as nationaliza­
tion have been added to the list of instruments in the tool kit. The 
fiscal redistribution of income from upper to lower income groups was 
expected to pick up secondary demand and employment effects via the impact 
of a different, more labor-intensive, final demand bundle. Finally, 
making the growth buggy move a little faster was expected to solve the 
poverty, if not the equity, problem. 
However, there now exists a growing consensus that at least centrally 
planned public works programs intended to solve the national underemploy­
ment and/or poverty problem are difficult to organize, blueprint and 
maintain; secondly, that nationalization, even if its negative output effects 
could be overcome, represents a clumsy instrument for redistribution via 
prices in the mixed economy. Thirdly, even if the notoriously low fiscal 
capacity of LDC governments could somehow be repaired, results of research 
at Rice and elsewhere3 indicates rather plearly that the changes in final 
demand composition required to make any real difference would be way out 
of proportion to what is realistically feasible. "Trickling down" to the 
poor through higher growth rates is seen as another non-starter--though only a few 
years ago Prebisch suggested this as a solution for Latin America--partly 
because we·cannot expect to have enough development fuel to-put into the 
development tank, and partly because, in any case, its consequences are 
unambiguously bad for distribution. 
3 see, for example, the work of R. Soligo and J. Land, as summarized in 
J. Land and R. Soligo, "Consumption Patterns, Factor Usage and the Distribution 
of Income: A Review of Some Findings," mimeo., Program of Development Studies 
(Rice University), 1974. 
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It is thus a sad but more or less generally agreed finding that, 
at least for the mixed developing economy, the only reasonable hope of 
doing something about poverty or distribution is through an attack on 
the nature of the growth path itself, i.e., changes in the rules of the 
output game, with or without a change in the distribution of initial chips 
or assets. Whether or not this conclusion is universally accepted, however, 
does not, of course, settle, but only begins to address, the central question 
of this paper, i.e., whether or not growth and distribution objectives, 
while they need to be viewed together, are by nature likely to constitute 
tradeoffs or complements, and/or in what specific types of situations they 
are inclined to be competitive rather than complementary. Finally, if these 
two pivotal societal objectives are indeed to some extent competitive, we 
might want to know how painful are these tradeoffs. 
This, it seems to me at least, is finally the right question, i.e., 
if distribution can be analyzed only in the context of growth, how do we 
in fact move towards an integration of either neoclassical or classical 
development theory, for what types of economies, with what measures of 
equity over time? Regardless of which index of inequality is ultimately preferred, 
4
and there are many ways of assessing the various measures available to us, 
it is therefore necessary to relate it to the performance of the system in 
its other,more familiar,aspects. In other words, since income distribution 
is usually "measurement without theory," linking it with other aspects of 
the growth performance should enable us to ultimately arrive at some 
4 see G. Fields and J.C.H. Fei, "On Inequality Comparisons," Economic 
Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 202, Yale University, May 1974; also 
A. B. Atkinson, "On the Measurement of Inequality," Journal of Economic 
Theory, 2, No. 3, 1970, pp. 244-263. 
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approximation to the aforementioned question. In fact, it is probably 
the only way to get from here to there. 
Section II briefly describes the nature of the available evidence on 
the relationship between growth and equity, mostly on the side of "trade-off 
pessimism." Section III makes an effort to present preliminary country 
experience which goes counter to the current conventional wisdom. Section IV 
makes a brief attempt at drawing some conclusions. 
II. The Prevailing Evidence: Trade-Off Pessimism 
It is fair to say that the overwhelming evidence available to date 
points in the direction of an inevitable, and rather severe, conflict 
between most conventional measures of equity for a given society and its 
growth performance. Working with cross-sections, Kuznets and Adelman and 
5Morris, find that LDC distributions, for instance, are substantially worse 
than DC distributions; especially for the top 20% of the population, incomes 
6 are clearly more equally distributed in the relatively rich countries. 
5s. Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic 
Review, 45, No. 1, 1955, pp. 1-28 and "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic 
Growth of Nations: VIII, Distribution of Income by Size," Economic Develop­
ment and Cultural Change, 11, No. 2, 1963, pp. 1-80; see also I. Adel.man and 
C. T. Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries, 
Stanford University Press, 1973, using other than only income variables. 
6The gap is probably even understated since, in the rich countries, 
there are more independent low-income households both at the very young and 
very old end of the tail than in poor countries--see Irving Kravis, "Inter­
national Differences in the- Distribution of Income," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 1960. 
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7Paukert --though he mixes family and individual income in some of his work--
points out that countries,as they move from $100 to $200 incomes per capita, 
reach a peak of income inequality, even if, as Cline points out, 8 the in­
verse U-shaped pattern is weaker within an LDC pattern of countries than when 
we stretch the cross-section across DCs and LDCs. 
Turning to time trends, these also appear to be generally favorable to 
the trade-off hypothesis. For example, Weisskoff finds income distribution 
10worsening in Argentina and Mexico, 9 as does Fishlow in the case of Brazii. 
There . f or Ph"l"i . ll that d"ist ri"but"ion pro a yis evi"dence the ippines income. bbl 
worsened during recent periods of fairly rapid growth. 
The point of this paper is not that this overwhelming mass of evidence 
can somehow be denied, but, rather, that there also exists counter-evidence, 
if admittedly less weighty in terms of the number of countries or their 
representativeness, which should also be considered and which should at 
least give us pause with respect to the inevitability of a conflict between 
these two societal objectives. The "deviant" countries, mainly Korea and 
Taiwan, are deviant in two senses, i.e., their levels of Gini 
7r. Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development: 
A Survey of Evidence," International Labour Review, 108, 1973, pp. 97-125. 
8w. R. Cline, "Distribution and Development," Journal of Development 
Economics, 1, 1975, pp. 359-400. 
9R. Weisskoff, "I~come Distribution and Economic Growth in Puerto Rico, 
Argentina and Mexico," The Review of Income and Wealth, December 1970. 
10A. Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," American Economic 
Review, May 1972. 
11G. Ranis, ed., Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment, 
Equity and Growth for the Philippines, International Labour Organization, 
1974. 
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are lower (in the .3 range rather than in the customary .5 range) and 
their Ginis have not risen during the first period of rapid transition 
growth. In other words, "things did not have to get worse before they could 
get better." These two country cases are admittedly "special" cases, i.e., the 
same pair which has previously given us "deviant" performance with respect 
to their spectacular, by now well-known, employment and income performance. 
Ditto for their related early departure from the general pattern of import 
substitution growth and their move towards export substitution based on 
mobilization of agriculture and the absorption of surplus labor in labor-
. t . . d 12in ensive in ustry. It is thus perhaps not surprising that it is again 
Korea and Taiwan--and perhaps, if we had the data, Japan historically as 
well--which present evidence of unusually favorable levels and trends of 
distribution along with rapid growth performance. 
While we recognize, with alacrity, that no two countries areEYer the 
same and that the "specialness" of these particular situations must be 
acknowledged, it nevertheless seems instructive to look at them more closely 
in terms of what pieces of the lesson are relevant or irrelevant to other 
LDCs. At a minimum, one successful counterexample is worth examining in 
detail. Moreover, it behooves us to look at other, less "special" cases to 
see if, at least in certain subphases of development, a similar diminution 
or elimination of the growth/distribution conflict can be observed. For 
example, Pakistan between 1961 and 1965, Colombia after 1967, Brazil between 
1963 and 1968, the Philippines between 1964 and 1968, all represent historical 
12 see J.C.H. Fei and G. Ranis, "A Model of Growth and Employment in 
the Open Dualistic Economy: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan," Journal of 
Development Studies, 11, No. 2, January 1975, pp. 32-63. 
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episodes of deviation from the pronounced import substitution syndrome 
and may turn out to represent interesting deviations from the generally 
accepted trade-off phenomenon worthy of more detailed study. 
Such an historical approach, if feasible, is,of course,to be preferred 
to cross-sectional analysis for all the well-known reasons. Hopefully, in 
addition to the Taiwan case on which this is a brief progress report, other 
longitudinal studies will soon become available. Two such studies are currently 
13
well along, i.e., on Korea and Pakistan. Others, e.g., on Colombia 
by G. Fields, and on Japan by the IDCJ group, may be available before 
too long. At a minimum, we would hope that studies for other countries will 
demonstrate that at least during particular periods of time when the overall 
environment underwent some change, such environments were more conducive to 
a softening or even an elimination of the observed conflict between growth 
and distribution objectives. Even though, at this stage of our knowledge, 
a full understanding of the interrelations between growth and income dis­
tribution still eludes us, a detailed examination of such "special case" 
deviations from what is assumed to be the common trend may well be worth 
the effort. 
13r. Adelman and S. Robinson's forthcoming book (Stanford University 
Press) on Korea, and M. Ayub's Yale Ph.D. dissertation in progress, on 
Pakistan. 
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What analysts and policy makers would presumably want to know, in 
particular, is to what extent the elements of the growth pattern, which 
apparently softened the conflict in, say, Taiwan, are present in other 
developing countries and to what extent they are not; and, if present, 
whether it is a lack of political will to make some difficult societal choices 
or something else which is at fault. Of special interest here is the issue 
of whether, assuming the Taiwan pattern could be imitated, any favorable 
outcome must be attributed to radical asset restructuring or whether it is 
possible to achieve these desirable outcomes by a mere "tinkering with 
relative prices." In other words, by letting markets work somewhat better, 
can we avoid the worsening maldistribution resulting so frequently from 
rapid growth, or do we need to take some strong measures, including land, 
capital and other institutional reforms? 
Thus, not only might more analytical light be shed on the pieces in 
the puzzle of a country like Taiwan, but the policy conclusions that might 
be drawn are of substantial general interest--even if not precisely relevant 
in their entirety, or in parts, elsewhere. Government efforts at redis~ 
tribution by moving directly to replace the market have become more frequent 
of late. It would be highly instructive to compare--always within the mixed 
economy constraint--the results of direct intervention to smooth the conflict 
between distribution and growth in such countries as India with the Korea or 
Taiwan experiences, using less direct intervention. The situation of the 
truly socialist countries, e.g., Cuba, China, and some of the less developed 
Eastern European countries, is different; they seem to have achieved lower 
14levels of Gini, if with not clearly established rapid growth rates. 
14 chenery, et al., op. cit., especially the country annexes. 
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All we want to assert in the context of this paper is that there exists 
conclusive evidence for at least one type of system, i.e., the mixed small, 
labor-surplus economy, represented by Taiwan, to the effect that rapid 
growth is compatible with both good levels and trends in the distribution 
of income. It is this record, and our attempt to understand it in terms 
of its underlying growth-related causes, reported on in Section III, that 
. f th . 1 • 15is o e greatest potentia interest. 
III. Trade-Off Optimism: A Deviant Case 
The Taiwanese growth and distribution record, in brief, is one of 
unusually low levels of Gini, around .3, coupled with unusually high rates 
of output growth, above 10%, during the 1960s. Moreover, what is even more 
interesting for our present purposes, is that the Gini in Taiwan did not 
follow the Kuznets inverse U-shaped pattern over time. Our data, though 
sketchier for the '50s than for the '60s, indicate that the overall Gini 
declined from a level of around .5 in 1953 to .4 in 1960 and held in the .3 
range between 1964 and 1968, declining markedly thereafter. In other words, 
if we accept the notion that Taiwan reached the end of labor surplus at the 
end of the '60s, there was in fact a substantial Gini decline once wages began 
to rise significantly, as most observers would expect. But what is much 
more interesting is the virtually complete avoidance of the Kuznets effect 
prior to the solution of the unemployment problem in the course of the 1960s. 
Again briefly, the growth side of the Taiwan story seems to be as 
follows: the typical regime of import substituting industrialization which 
15 
what follows represents a preliminary sketch of some findings of a 
study being carried out, with John Fei and Shirley Kuo, for the World Bank. 
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characterized Taiwanese policy from 1953 to roughly 1960 was not conducive 
to employment or the related (but not identical) improvement in the dis­
tribution of income in Taiwan, any more than in other developing countries. 
The well-known distortion of relative factor and output prices during an 
import substitution policy period yields unnecessarily capital-intensive 
techniques and output mixes, as is also well known. Even in Taiwan, employ­
ment both in rural and urban areas had to take a back seat as long as capital 
and imports were undervalued, and the receipt of an import license or a bank 
loan, in the presence of overvalued exchange rates and low official interest 
rates, bestowed large windfall profits and represented the major objective 
of entrepreneurial activity. In fact, the level of the Gini in 1953 was 
about equivalent to that of most contemporary LDCs. We should, however, 
note that the basic initial conditions for an improvement were laid via 
land reforms which took place in three steps during the early '50s, plus 
the fortuitous impact of a fairly evenly distributed migrant flow of capital 
and entrepreneurship from the Mainland in the late 1940s. Moreover, while 
Taiwan suffered from a relative neglect of agriculture, like all import 
substitution cases, the heavy irrigation and institutional infrastructure 
left by the Japanese colonial system made it possible for agriculture to never­
theless make substantial progress even during the 1950s. This is one way of 
explaining the gradual decline of the Gini even before the advent of the 
16
policy reforms of the early '60s. We are, moreover, quite confident that 
import substitution of a more flexible type, as practiced in Taiwan, prevented 
16 It should, however, be noted again that the data for this period are 
much less adequate and that Ginis of any reliability are only available for 
agricultural income. 
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the economy from getting into the well-known structural ruts experienced 
by many other LDCs. For example, unions never played any important role, and 
protection, including quantitative controls and tariffs, was never quite 
as severe as encountered elsewhere. But most important of all, in an 
absolute sense, the agricultural sector continued to enjoy a good deal of 
favorable government attention. 
Turning to the decade of the 1960s, Taiwan early on 
instituted a series of major reforms, moving her from an import substitution 
17onto an export substitution pattern of growth. As a consequence of this 
shift towards an export-oriented industrial growth pattern, it became possible 
for maturing industrial entrepreneurship to combine with plentiful unskilled 
labor supplies for industrial production, destined both for domestic and, 
increasingly, foreign markets. Thus, the important symbiotic relationship 
between high growth rates and employment was established, culminating, by 
the end of the decade, in the termination of labor surplus and the coming 
of the so-called'commercialization point:118 Fortunately, the good income 
distribution data becoming available after 1964 place us in a better position 
to analyze the relationship between distribution and the growth pattern during 
this export substitution period. Moreover, since growth accelerated during 
the 1960s, this is also a period of greatest interest to those who want to 
analyze why the Kuznets-type conflict pattern failed to put in an appearance. 
17 see Fei and Ranis, op. cit., for more detail. 
18 see J.C.H.Fei and G. Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: 
Theory and Policy, Richard D. Irwin, 1964. 
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If we look more closely at the Taiwanese record on income distribution, 
we find the overall Gini more or less constant between 1964 and 1968 at .33, 
and declining substantially thereafter (i.e., by more than 10%), to about .29. 
This is strong evidence that the Kuznets effect was entirely avoided before 
the end of labor surplus had been reached around 1968. 19 In order to get at 
the growth-related underlying sources of inequality, a decomposition of the 
overall Gini, in this case into the various relevant factor Ginis and their 
re1ative• weig. hts in. tota1 f · 1 . · d 20ami y income, can, moreover, be performe. 
From this, a number of interesting features emerge, which permit us to push 
the causal explanation much further. However, this represents work in progress, 
and we can only hint at it in the course of this paper. 
For one, as we would expect, the Gini for the profit share of income 
is higher than for the overall income Gini; the Gini for the wage share is 
lower than the overall Gini. Moreover, the wage share itself becomes in­
creasingly important over the period, rising from .4 of total income in 1964 
to .5 by 1968 and to .6 by 1972. The interpretation of this is that the wage 
share rises even during the unlimited supply of labor condition, which, con­
21trary to the arguments of Arthur Lewis and others, indicates that, 
even when wages are more or less constant, labor's share can 
increase as a consequence of a rapidly increasing total volume 
of employment and number of hours worked per employee. 
19 This turning point around 1968 has been independently identified in 
other work (see Fei and Ranis, "A Model of Growth and Employment ••• ," op. cit.), 
and is linked to a substantial change in the growth pattern of real wages, 
unskilled and skilled, around that time. 
20This procedure is developed in J.C.H. Fei, G. Ranis, and S. W. Kuo, 
"Growth and the Family Distribution of Income by Factor Components," Economic 
Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 223, Yale University, revised January 1976. 
21 W. A. Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," 
The Manchester School, May 1954. 
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• . . h . 22 h •Kuznets, Arturh Lewis, Marxist and dependencia t eorists all ave in 
common the view that as growth really begins to get under way in earnest, 
income distribution must worsen as the profit share rises, especially in 
the modern sector, and as there is greater asset accumulation by the rich 
than the poor, in both sectors, and (as especially Kuznets would add) the 
shift from rural to urban activities enhances the relative size of the 
more unequal sector. What this argument apparently neglects is the pos­
sibility, as demonstrated by the Taiwanese case, that we may simultaneously 
experience rent reductiora in agriculture and a change in the relative posi­
tion of groups within the laboring class,permitting the overall Gini to be 
improved by the combination of a rising functional distribution of wage 
income, falling agricultural income Ginis and only slightly rising wage Ginis. 
Secondly, if we divide the population into urban and rural households 
and compute the overall and factor Ginis (and weights) separately, we can 
see that,for rural households, the overall Gini declines during the '60s, 
from .33 to .29, holding more or less steady thereafter. This is related 
to a rapid decline, as we would expect, in the importance of agricultural 
income relative to non-agricultural income--the share of agricultural income 
in the total falling from .66 to ',42 in the course of six years. This 
finding indicates that rural family incomes benefit as reallocation from 
agriculture to non-agriculture activities proceeds if that reallocation is 
not necessarily to a distant urban sector, and participated in by the richer 
elements of the rural classes, but takes place in the rural areas and is 
heavily represented by the relatively poorer elements of the rural population. 
22see W. Cline, "Distribution and Development," op. cit. 
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Rapid rural mobilization based on the improvement of the efficiency of the 
relatively poor farmers, both as farmers and as participants in the important 
and growing rural industries and services,does play a decisive role in the 
elimination of the Kuznets effect overall and, incidentally, its complete 
absence with respect to the rural families taken by themselves. 
Finally, taking the urban families separately, we find that here the 
Ginis do rise slightly before the 1968 "turning point," i.e., from .33 to .34, 
declining rapidly thereafter--to .29. This indicates that here, in fact, 
the Kuznets pattern does obtain, i.e., equity for the urban families under 
rapid growth can improve only after the turning point when wages can begin 
to rise in a sustained fashion and the growing functional distribution of 
income in favor of labor once again, but now for different reasons, contributes 
to an improving size distribution of income. 
Looking at the entire development experience from the early '50s to the 
early '70s in Taiwan, we are thus able to make the following general comments 
at this stage of our understanding. During the 1950s, the 
import substitution subphase, land reform prevented the maldistribution of 
assets, a common feature of LDCs, from becoming part of the landscape. 
Moreover, early on, the existence of substantial infrastructure, in the form 
of irrigation, roads and such institutions as farmers' associations, per­
mitted agriculture to play an important role even during the import substitu­
tion phase and for land to be used rather intensively. Land reform, which 
was partly in the form of reduction of rents, partly in the sale of govern-
ment lands and partly by transferring "soil to the tillers," i.e., tenancy reform, 
avoided the growth of the large landless rural worker class which often 
-17-
accompanies land reform and agricultural productivity increase in other 
countries, thus worsening the distribution of rural income. As a consequence, 
as the small owner/operators now used family labor, larger owners were 
induced to hire labor and, most importantly, landless rural workers and/or 
small or poor owner/operators could be absorbed into the rapidly growing 
secondary activities in agriculture. These activities included not only 
rural industries and services but also such secondary crops as vegetables, 
mushrooms, asparagus, etc., which played an important role in the Taiwanese 
case. Rural works programs generated at the local level by local initiative 
also played a complementary role in providing additional employment oppor­
tunities, but, more importantly, in clearing the way for the aforementioned 
increases in the directly productive activities, in food producing agricul­
ture, in secondary crops, and in rural industry and service activities. 
In the 1960s, when the growth regime changed to one of export substitu­
tion, rapid, export-oriented industrialization was accompanied by a sub­
stantially enhanced growth of agricultural productivity, especially when the 
high yielding varieties were superimposed on an already very productive and 
research-oriented food producing agricultural sector. Here again, as we 
know from other country experience, who gets the new technology and can use 
it in terms of the availability of other inputs, water, credit, infrastruc­
ture, etc., and what are the mechanization side effects of the high yielding 
varieties on labor absorption, are among the critical issues. In Taiwan, 
it is quite clear that the unit of cultivation did not change very much as a 
consequence of increased agricultural productivity; that mechanization was held 
in abeyance until the end of the decade when labor surplus began to disappear; 
-18-
and that agricultural income at its source, if we look at the Gini for 
agricultural income as such, did not worsen. Even more important was the 
already mentioned rapid growth of rural industries and servi9es and their 
relatively labor-intensive characteristic. This latter feature 
23
h . h h . d 1 h . d. h . 1w ic we ave examine e sew ere, in icates t e important roe 
decentralized industrialization efforts can play in avoiding some of the 
costs of dualistic growth that have been pointed to by Arthur Lewis, 
Kuznets and others. Agriculture is basically a constant returns industry, 
with the technology of the high yielding varieties essentially scale-neutral. 
Thus, if the normal S-curve of the adoption of new varieties is permitted 
24to play itself out, there need be no fear of a possible conflict between 
the two societal objectives. Once the problem of who gets the benefits is 
solved, once the farmers' association type of institutional network pro­
vides possibilities for not only generating the agricultural surplus at its 
source but for channeling it into rural activities,understood and owned by 
the farmers themselves, the key ingredients for the absence of conflict and 
maximum mutual reinforcement are present. 
It is not possible in the context of this paper to go into a 
detailed analysis of the underlying causes of the softening and virtual 
elimination of the Kuznets effect in the case of the Taiwanese rapid growth 
experience. The above discussion is merely intended as illustrative of the train 
theme of this paper, namely, that the analysis of at least one deviant 
23G._Ranis, "Industrial Sector Labor Absorption," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 21, No. 3, 1973, pp. 387-408. 
24rt would certainly be the height of folly to curb further diffusion 
of technology because of avoidable deleterious distributional effects. 
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country case in which growth, employment and distribution were mutually 
reinforcing,rather than competitive, should give us all some pause--and 
perhaps lead us to examine particular facets of other country situations 
more carefully before we accept the inevitability of conflict. 
IV. Conclusions 
In summarizing the five country case studies included as an annex to 
the Chenery et al. volume, 
25 Jolly presented a number of conclusions which 
he felt could be derived from these, admittedly sketchy, attempts to look 
at income redistribution and growth experience in a number of very different 
countries. He pointed out,quite correctly,that in the socialist countries 
in the sample, i.e., Cuba and Tanzania at least, whatever income redistribu­
tion-occurred was the result of conscious government policy directed toward 
that objective, and that the income distribution results in a more market­
oriented mixed economy like Taiwan, were more the by-product of policies 
aimed at growth. It is important, however, to note that the Gini in 
Tanzania, .48, as well as the growth rates in both Tanzania and Cuba compare 
rather unfavorably at least as of this date; in fact, as Jolly also points out, 
the only two cases of very rapid growth accompanied by redistribution seem 
to have occurred in the Korea/Taiwan cases. 
We recognize that all the returns are not in, especially with respect 
to the Mainland China experience. Nevertheless, at this stage of our under­
standing, we may conclude that the achievement of substantial complementarity 
2 
5Redistribution with Growth, op. cit. 
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between growth and redistribution may be possible in a labor surplus socialist 
LDC following the Chinese pattern, with all its implications for total 
societal mobilization. On the other hand, if a country has chosen a mixed 
economy pattern--wherever it decides to locate itself on the wide spectrum 
of available institutional/political choices--it is likely to be very diffi­
cult to achieve a happy combination of growth and redistribution via direct 
interventions by government on behalf of the poor. If there is one thing 
the Bardhan piece on India illustrates extremely we11, 26 it is that every 
time mixed economy governments intervene on behalf of the poor, the poor 
find themselves worse off.. We do not wish to get into the question of 
whether this is due to an imperfect understanding on the part of the elite 
of how the system really works, or an all-too-perfect understanding. Be that 
as it may, one positive conclusion, for us at least, is that just as the 
market mechanism can be (and has been) used as an instrument for growth in 
some Eastern European socialist countries, it may be the only reliable device 
to minimize the conflict between growth and redistribution in a mixed de­
veloping economy. 
Secondly, while we are willing to accept the "specialness" of the 
Taiwanese experience in terms of the peculiar constellation of good initial 
conditions inherited from the Japanese, as well as the political realities 
since, it seems foolish to waive aside this deviant experience as readily 
as is often the case. Certainly the argument that spectacular growth was 
related to the singularly heavy inflow of U.S. capital is factually incorrect. 
26Redistribution with Growth, op. cit., Annex. 
27roreign capital may have been strategically important, especially to 
facilitate the transition from import to export substitution. But its quanti­
tative impact has been much exaggerated (for details, see Fei and Ranis, "A 
Model of Growth and Employment •.• ," op. cit.). Moreover, why U.S. assisted 
growth should have particularly egalitarian effects in Taiwan and not elsewhere 
has never really been satisfactorily addressed. 
27 
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The point that can and should be made instead is that the Taiwan experience 
demonstrates that market allocations do not have to work on behalf of the 
rich but can be made to work on behalf of the poor--at least if two condi­
tions are met, i.e., assets, both in agriculture and non-.agriculture, are 
not very unequally distributed at the outset, and relative prices are reason­
ably realistic indicators of resource availabilities. It is thus incorrect 
to say that "we tried our best for growth in the '60s" and that we must now 
"try our best for distribution," or that "we tried liberal refonns in the '60s" 
and "must now reach for the radical medicine bottle." Both judgments 
seem premature since we have seldom really tried "tinkering with relative 
prices" in the presence of relatively favorable initial asset conditions. 
The LDC record of the last two decades, in short, is a poor basis for 
judging the inevitability or lack of inevitability of a conflict in employ­
ment, distribution and output objectives. It may thus be seriously misleading 
with respect to the future, given the policy package which obtained in most 
of the developing world during the '50s and '60s, and, in fact, continues 
to dominate the landscape to this day. Especially in the labor surplus 
economy context, it is easy to document at least the theoretical possibility 
of increasing both output and employment at the same time that income dis­
tribution does not deteriorate and possibly even improves. The case of 
Taiwan, moreover, gives us a real live example that this is also factually 
possible to achieve as an LDC moves into its export substitution subphase 
of transition growth. 
In our view, the problem, frankly, is not mainly a technical one. 
Based on our own understanding of the Taiwanese case to date, there is no 
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reason why, with the proper set of policies, many LDCs could not have their 
cake and eat it too, perhaps twice over, i.e., by choosing a more labor­
intensive and participatory growth path. In the case of Taiwan, this meant 
shifting from a relatively enlightened and flexible import substitution 
regime into a trade-oriented industrial export regime over time. It also 
meant early attention to agricultural infrastructure and productivity in­
crease and to a decentralized rural industrial growth pattern, with output 
mixes and technologies continuously responsive to changing factor endowments. 
Effecting such changes requires,of course,political agreement among the 
various major parties to the social contract, and is much easier to accom­
plish when the resistance offered by vested interests,which have grown up 
under import substitution,is relatively small and/or the government is 
relatively strong. Both conditions were met in Taiwan. That landless rural 
workers, small farmers and other target groups are bound to benefit from 
such changes in strategy is clear enough. But it is often less clear that, 
if landlords or large-scale industrialists are to be penalized, it would not 
necessarily have to be in the nature of a permanent penalty. Rather, it is 
likely to call for changes in the way in which incomes are earned, e.g., in 
the case of industrialists, a shift from windfall profits derived from 
government-induced restraints of competition, cheap capital imports, low 
interest rates, etc., to profits earned by participating in the expanding 
industrial export markets. 
28
As has been pointed out elsewhere, the alternative of "business as 
28 e.g., G. Ranis, "Employment, Equity and Growth: Lessons from the 
Philippine Employment Mission," International Labour Review, 110, No. 1, 
July 1974. 
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usual" in most of the developing countries is likely to lead to a 
continuing build-up of social and political pressures by those who take 
the current rhetoric seriously. Also--and this is a point less well 
understood--the ultimate souring of even private rates of return in narrowly 
constrained LDC industrial sectors as domestic markets continue to dwindle 
and the process of fuelling import substitution becomes increasingly ex­
pensive and likely to boomerang on the elite classes themselves. Even 
bonanzas of the oil and other traditional natural resources variety, unless 
indefinitely and generously sustained, may serve only to put off the day of 
reckoning. 
In spite of the increasing atmospherics of confrontationism between 
North and South, as well as rich and poor within each, this observer is 
not yet ready to accept the conspiracy theory that''vested interests do not 
intend to change anything but their rhetoric." I am, rather, more inclined 
to the interpretation that it is very understandable and human for such 
interests to try to avoid unpleasant decisions if there is a ready-made 
alternative at hand--such as a boom in traditional exports or the successful 
search for new ones--and/or if foreign capital flows permit the maintenance 
of the present narrow structure of growth. Growth rates can be maintained 
in this fashion--as the record of the '50s and '60s indicates--but it is 
much more doubtful how long the increasing disparity between what is said 
about equity and what is done about it can be tolerated. We recognize that 
it is only some donors and a small minority of the spokesmen of the developing 
world who are now insisting on a more equity-and poverty-oriented development 
pattern. Developing societies, like ours, are poly-centered and complicated. 
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All we can do as political economists--which we are forced to be, whether 
we like it or not--is to improve our understanding of the causal relation­
ships between growth and equity and to point out the extent to which 
societies that are not yet on the frontier could, in fact, improve their 
position with respect to both objectives. 
